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Abstract
Every dictator dislikes free media. Yet, many non-democratic countries have partially free
or almost free media. In this paper, we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships
and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory. In our model, free media
allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of
government. The importance of this beneﬁt varies with the natural-resource endowment. In
resource-rich countries, bureaucratic incentives are less important for the dictator; hence, media
freedom is less likely to emerge. Using panel data, we show that controlling for country ﬁxed
eﬀects, media are less free in oil-rich economies, with the eﬀect especially pronounced in non-
democratic regimes. These results are robust to model speciﬁcation and the inclusion of various
controls, including economic development, democracy, country size, size of government, and
others.
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§New Economic School/CEFIR and CEPR; ksonin@nes.ru.“We need full and truthful information. And the truth should not depend upon
whom it has to serve. We can accept only the division between the unoﬃcial information
(for the Comintern Executive only) and oﬃcial information (for everybody).”
Vladimir Lenin (1921).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Free media are an anathema for any dictator. Still, there is substantial variation in the degree of
the media freedom even controlling for the level of democracy. Why would some non-democratic
regimes allow free or partially free media? What are the circumstances under which it might be
beneﬁcial to a dictator to allow some degree of media freedom? A possible answer is suggested by a
situation we might call “Gorbachev’s dilemma.”1 In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the new leader of the
Soviet Union, faced an array of problems. A surge in the budget deﬁcit following a sharp drop in oil
prices was the latest sign that the command economy, which had already underperformed relative
to the West for more than a decade, required signiﬁcant restructuring. Without allowing a certain
amount of media freedom, reforms of the highly ineﬃcient bureaucratic system seemed all but
impossible. In a small meeting with leading Soviet intellectuals, Gorbachev acknowledged: “The
restructuring is progressing with great diﬃculty. We have no opposition party. How then can we
control ourselves? Only through criticism and self-criticism. Most important: through glasnost.”2
On the other hand, free ﬂow of information could undermine the very foundations of the Communist
Party’s dictatorship. In the very same meeting, Gorbachev warned that “Democratism without
glasnost does not exist. At the same time, democracy without limits is anarchy. That’s why it will
be diﬃcult.”
Gorbachev’s dilemma was by no means unique: every non-democratic regime has to provide an
incentive system for low-tier oﬃcials, and most such regimes fear the free ﬂow of information as
a threat to their political survival. In this paper we study the trade-oﬀ between allowing for free
or partially free media in order to provide proper incentives to subordinates, and censorship that
1The term was introduced by Eugene H. Methvin as the title for an article in the National Review (Dec. 4, 1987).
The article starts “One swallow does not make a spring. And one prompt TASS report of rioting in Central Asia
does not make a free Soviet press. But among Kremlin watchers it is certainly a noteworthy occurrence — as if, say,
a California condor showed up at Capistrano.”
2“Gorbachev on the future: ‘We will not give in,’” New York Times, December 22, 1986; glasnost,R u s s i a nf o r
openness, was then understood as partial media freedom.
1limits citizens’ ability to overcome coordination problems in organizing a revolt. In particular, we
focus on the role of resource abundance, which aﬀects this trade-oﬀ. In resource-rich countries,
a dictator has larger rents to lose from a revolt and has less interest in providing incentives to
his bureaucrats; therefore, even partial media freedom is less likely. We use a panel with country
ﬁxed eﬀects to demonstrate that this is indeed the case: in non-democratic countries, resource
abundance results in less free media. Also, we provide evidence that an alternative explanation for
this relationship - namely, that resource wealth allows dictators to consolidate power - cannot fully
account for all the observed empirical regularities.
The trade-oﬀ between political control and bureaucratic incentives is also well illustrated by the
slow response of Chinese state oﬃcials to the recent outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS). In the absence of free media, incentives for lower-tier bureaucrats to provide suﬃcient eﬀort
and transmit necessary information to higher levels proved inadequate (Saich, 2003). Although the
ﬁrst information on SARS was received by local political authorities in November 2002, there was no
real action until at least the end of March 2003. When on March 15 the World Health Organization
issued a global warning on SARS, the Chinese Propaganda Department prohibited Chinese media
from reporting it (Washington Post, May 13, 2003). Beijing public hospitals were trying to conceal
the extent of the disease by hiding or transferring patients during visits of WHO oﬃcials (Time,
April 18, 2003).3 Four years later, Chinese authorities responded in a similar an AIDS outbreak
met the same response from the Chinese authorities (“China’s AIDS Scandal,”Economist,J a n u a r y
18, 2007).
Dictators’ fear of free media is well justiﬁed. As the recent “color revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have shown, even partly independent media are crucial in replacing non-
democratic rulers (McFaul, 2005, Hill, 2005). Yet there is much variation in media freedom even
among dictatorial regimes. As shown in Figure 1, many dictatorships have partially free media;
there are also some dictatorial regimes where media freedom is at the level of new EU members.
3Saich (2003), in a week-by-week analysis, attributes the slow reaction to bureaucratic ineﬃciency and disincentives
for local politicians to gather and transmit information to higher levels. “Once action is called for, the vertical and
segmented structure of China’s bureaucracy hampers eﬀective action. It is diﬃcult to gather information across
diﬀerent sectors.”(“The Real Fallout From China’s Chernobyl,” Financial Times, May 27, 2003.) Saich quotes a
number of high-proﬁle publications in the Chinese media, which operate under tight political control, claiming that
any information on the new disease was merely rumor. The Chernobyl disaster, which occurred on April 26, 1986,
was not acknowledged by Soviet oﬃcials until two days later, when the news had already spread across the Western
media.
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Figure 1: Democracy and media freedom across countries (both averaged for 1993—2007). Democ-
racy is the Polity IV’s variable Polity2 ranging from -10 (perfect autocracy) to 10 (perfect democ-
racy). Media freedom is 100−Freedom House’s score. Freedom House classiﬁe sm e d i ai n t of r e e
(70-100 in this graph), partially free (40-70), and not free (0-40).
Why do dictators tolerate or even allow media freedom? We suggest that even partially free media
might be a part of the incentive scheme for the state bureaucracy. The lack of such incentives
undermines the state’s capacity to handle major challenges such as war, large-scale natural disasters,
or macroeconomic crises. In these cases, even the censored media may fail to cover up the dictator’s
incompetence, which might eventually bring the regime down. For example, an inability to cope
with the Chernobyl disaster exposed the need for change in the Soviet Union. As one observer noted
(Methvin in National Review, Dec. 4, 1987), “There surely must be days—maybe the morning after
Chernobyl—when Gorbachev wishes he could buy a Kremlin equivalent of the Washington Post and
ﬁnd out what is going on in his socialist wonderland.”4
Gorbachev’s dilemma” suggests that the need for control over the bureaucracy endogenously
4The fall of Romania’s Ceau¸ sescu (Hardin, 1995, p.31) shows that in the absence of free media, a dictator may
lose touch completely, which in turn makes even a very centralized regime structurally vulnerable. On December 21,
1989, after days of local and seemingly limited unrest in the province of Timi¸ soara, Ceau¸ sescu called for a grandiose
meeting at the central square of Bucharest, apparently to rally the crowds in support of his leadership. In a stunning
development, the meeting degenerated into anarchy, and Ceau¸ sescu and his wife had to ﬂee the presidential palace,
only to be executed by a ﬁring squad two days later.
3constrains dictators’ suppression of media freedom. To provide a basis for empirical investigation,
we consider a simple model that captures this trade-oﬀ. A dictator chooses a policy that aﬀects
both his own and his citizens’ interests. A policy succeeds only if it is properly implemented,
which requires hiring bureaucrats who may either work or shirk. In order to induce high eﬀort,
the dictator needs some veriﬁable information on the bureaucrats’ performance. The dictator can
rely on special monitoring agencies, but these are vulnerable to collusion with the bureaucrats they
monitor; preventing such collusion is costly. In the case of uncensored media, this collusion is ruled
out by the free-rider problem and competition between decentralized media.5 However, the media
also make the policy outcome known to the public, which may threaten the dictator’s position in
power. If the media report that the policy has failed, the public infers that the dictator is likely
to be inept; therefore, the citizens would be better oﬀ replacing the dictator. More importantly, a
negative media report not only makes individual citizens aware of the dictator’s incompetence, it
makes the dictator’s incompetence common knowledge, which is critical for a successful revolution.
Revolutions involve a coordination problem: a citizen takes part in a revolt against an incumbent
only if he knows that others will join a revolt (e.g., Tilly, 1978; Chwe, 2003; Persson and Tabellini,
2006).6 In equilibrium, the dictator is replaced whenever there is a public report of the policy
failure; then each citizens knows that his/her misery is shared by others and everyone is suﬃciently
unhappy to make an uprising against the incumbent worthwhile.
In order to check the empirical relevance of this trade-oﬀ,w ee x a m i n et h ec o n s e q u e n c e so f
variation in natural-resource abundance. In a resource-rich country, the dictator is more interested
in remaining in oﬃce (as rents are higher); moreover, he cares less for bureaucratic incentives as
the resource rents can compensate for poor economic policies. Our theory therefore implies that
oil-rich countries are likely to have less free media. Moreover, this relationship should be especially
strong in less democratic countries, where other feedback channels do not function properly. We
use both cross-country and panel data to test these predictions. We take media freedom indices
from Freedom House and Reporters Sans Frontières,; a democracy index from Polity IV; and oil
reserves, oil price and oil production ﬁgures from BP. Figure 2 shows pair-wise correlations between
5In assuming that the presence of several media sources makes suppressing information more costly, we rely on
models of media competition by Besley and Prat (2006) and Gehlbach and Sonin (2008).
6Media freedom is not the only mechanism for aggregating information that is dangerous to rulers. Some autocrats
allow free elections at the local level, decentralized NGOs, or civil society development. Lorentzen (2007) argues that
China’s central government uses local riots to obtain information on the performance of provincial bureaucrats. In
this paper, we focus on the media, but the tradeoﬀ e x t e n d st oo t h e ri n s t i t u t i o n s .
4oil reserves and media freedom within selected countries over time.7 The graphs demonstrate that
the slope is negative in non-democratic countries but positive or ﬂat in democratic ones; this
relationship is present even within a very short time span. In Section 4, we show that this result
is not limited to a few countries but holds in a comprehensive panel of countries, controlling for
country ﬁxed eﬀects, the level of economic development, democracy, and other relevant variables.
On average, the media are indeed less free in oil-rich countries. The eﬀect of natural resources on
media freedom is especially strong in less democratic countries; in mature democracies, there is
no relationship between oil reserves and media freedom.8 These results also hold in cross-sectional
analysis. As Figure 3 demonstrates, there is a similar relationship between oil price and media
freedom (in this ﬁg u r e ,w eu s et h es a m es c a l ef o re a c ho ft h eg r a p h s ;n o t i c et h a ti nd e m o c r a c i e st h e
eﬀect is almost negligible). There, oil-rich countries exhibit a sharper negative slope; the positive
slope in the case of Mexico is driven by both democratization in the 1990s and, even more so, by
a sharp drop in its proven oil reserves.
The above results are statistically signiﬁcant and robust to adding a variety of controls, including
levels of development, democracy, country size, government size, and others. (Section 4 describes
robustness checks, including splitting the sample into smaller subsamples and running a jackknife
test that leaves out one country at a time.) Interestingly, the eﬀect’s magnitude is the same whether
we run panel or cross-sectional regressions and whether we choose the logarithm of oil reserves or
the logarithm of oil production as an independent variable. According to our estimates, increasing
oil reserves by 10% would reduce media freedom by 0.3 points on a scale from 0 to 100. In other
words, if Brazil’s reserves were at Venezuela’s level, Brazil’s media freedom would have developed
likewise.
Our empirical strategy is based on the fact that both oil reserves (as well as oil production)
and media freedom change substantially within a country in the course of just one or two decades.
First, oil reserves and oil production are responsive to mostly exogenous and highly volatile oil
prices. Proven oil reserves are estimated as those that are economically viable under prevailing
market prices for oil; production responds to the oil price to earn the maximum possible rents–
this, for example, is the case of Russia). Also, as there is substantial randomness in discovering
7We do not present graphs for Saudi Arabia, where the slope is also negative but the variation in reserves from
1993 to 2005 is negligible.
8Smith (2008), basing his empirical exercise on Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), arrives at a conclusion similar
to ours, though the main dependent variable in his analysis is the probability of regime survival.
51998 1999 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
4 4.2 4.4
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Russia
1992
1993
1994 1995
1996 1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 2005
2006
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
2.5 3 3.5 4
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Mexico
1992
1993
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
2000
2001 2002
2003 2004
2005 2006
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
4 4.2 4.4
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Venezuela
1992
1993
1994 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 2005
2006
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
4.5 5
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Iran
1992
1993 1994 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005 2006
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
7
5
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
1.5 2 2.5 3
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Brazil
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003 2004
2005
2006
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
3 3.5 4
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Kazakhstan
1992 1993
1994 1995
1996
1997 1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 2005
2006
8
0
8
5
9
0
9
5
1
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
3.4 3.5
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
USA
1992
1993
1994
1995 1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
7
5
8
0
8
5
9
0
9
5
1
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
2.4 2.7 3 3.3
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Canada
1992
1993
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
20002001 2002
2003 2004
2005
2006
8
0
8
5
9
0
9
5
1
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
2.4 2.5
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Norway
1998 1999 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
4 4.2 4.4
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Russia
1992
1993
1994 1995
1996 1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 2005
2006
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
2.5 3 3.5 4
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Mexico
1992
1993
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
2000
2001 2002
2003 2004
2005 2006
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
4 4.2 4.4
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Venezuela
1992
1993
1994 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 2005
2006
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
4.5 5
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Iran
1992
1993 1994 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005 2006
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
7
5
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
1.5 2 2.5 3
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Brazil
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003 2004
2005
2006
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
3 3.5 4
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Kazakhstan
1992 1993
1994 1995
1996
1997 1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 2005
2006
8
0
8
5
9
0
9
5
1
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
3.4 3.5
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
USA
1992
1993
1994
1995 1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
7
5
8
0
8
5
9
0
9
5
1
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
2.4 2.7 3 3.3
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Canada
1992
1993
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
20002001 2002
2003 2004
2005
2006
8
0
8
5
9
0
9
5
1
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
n
e
x
t
 
y
e
a
r
2.4 2.5
Log of oil reserves in billion barrels
Norway
Figure 2: Pairwise correlations between oil reserves and media freedom in select oil-rich countries,
1993—2006. Source: Freedom House, BP, authors’ calculations.
new oil ﬁelds, oil reserves may change by tens of percents just within a year (we discuss the issue of
endogeneity of exploration eﬀorts later)–this is the case of Brazil and Kazakhstan. Second, unlike
other political institutions, media freedom can change very quickly.
While we focus on testing the prediction that natural-resource abundance undermines media
freedom in non-democratic societies, we also control for alternative explanations. First, there is a
positive correlation (and, potentially, two-way causality) between media freedom and the level of
democracy per se. It is well-known that there is a correlation between natural resource abundance
and the probability of having a dictatorial regime (see, e.g., Ross, 2001, and Tsui, 2005). Our
empirical tests show that natural resources are a signiﬁcant determinant of the media freedom,
even when controlling for the level of democracy, either current or lagged. We also run a two-stage
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Figure 3: Pairwise correlations between oil price and media freedom in select oil-rich countries,
1993—2006. Source: Freedom House, BP, authors’ calculations.
speciﬁcation: in the ﬁrst stage we estimate a relationship between media freedom, democracy, and
other determinants of media freedom except oil wealth. In the second stage, we use the deviation
of media freedom from the predicted value to show that media freedom is likely to be lower in
oil-rich countries. In yet another test, we show that, as predicted by our theory, our results hold
for non-democratic and partially democratic countries but not for democracies. On the other hand,
the correlation between natural resources and lower democracy holds for all the subsamples; in
this sense, media freedom and democracy are certainly not the same thing. We also provide other
empirical tests (see Section 4).
Second, media freedom may be negatively correlated with resource abundance, as the latter
provides dictators with the means to compensate citizens for censorship. E.g., Ross (2001) observes
7that a dictator might simply use resource rents to buy oﬀ political challengers. In our framework,
this argument requires that citizens value media freedom per se while dictators do not, for the
standard reason that media may help in overcoming the coordination problem in revolts. Yet
dictators with no available resources are forced to allow free media, as otherwise citizens would
revolt anyway. This “buy-oﬀ” argument treats resource rents as extra revenues available to a
dictator. From this point of view, natural resources are equivalent to foreign aid or any other
sources of income that he can use to pay oﬀ his citizens. We control for the total amount of
resources that dictator can redistribute (GDP per capita, share of government expenditures in
GDP) and for social structure/inequality (via country ﬁxed eﬀects); we ﬁnd that our results are
robust. To provide one more test of our theory against alternative explanations, we rerun our
main regressions including both oil reserves and oil production in the regression. Our theory puts
more weight on oil reserves, whereas alternative explanations predict a relationship between media
freedom and current resource rents. As oil output and oil resources are highly correlated, the only
meaningful way to compare their eﬀects is to include them in the regression equation simultaneously.
It appears that the eﬀect of oil reserves is–as predicted by our theory–negative and signiﬁcant;
thus, our theory “wins the horse race.” Finally, we provide additional evidence that media freedom
does improve the quality of bureaucracy, even when controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects and other
variables.
Thus, our theory demonstrates that in the presence of abundant resources, dictators are less
willing to allow free media. Consistent with our theory, non-democratic countries such as Nigeria,
Zambia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Saudi Arabia have vast resources and poor growth performance,
while the Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), while predominantly
non-democratic in 1970s and 1980s, have both high growth rates and scarce natural resources. These
East Asian countries have managed to establish an eﬀective meritocratic bureaucracy (Evans and
Rauch, 1999, 2000; see also Gehlbach and Keefer, 2006, on the role of institutionalized parties
in autocracies). Again, it is perhaps not coincidental that Gorbachev chose glasnost as the Soviet
Union faced a substantial decline in the price of oil,9 its major commodity export. In contrast, with
oil prices rising, Putin’s Russia has experienced a signiﬁcant decline in media freedom (Figure 3).
9While the policy of perestroika was proclaimed in 1985, it was not until 1987 that glasnost was introduced on
a large scale. In 1985—1986, Gorbachev focused on uskorenie (acceleration/modernization). 1986 was the year of a
sharp oil price decline and also of the Chernobyl disaster; both these events may have revealed the need for glasnost
to the Soviet leaders.
8Instead of free media, dictators might create monitoring/control agencies, often including secret
services, to spy on the bureaucrats. Unlike decentralized free media, such agencies can commit to
producing information for the dictator without leaking it to the public. On the other hand, they
could potentially also collude with bureaucrats in concealing information about their dismal per-
formance. In some countries, dictators prevent collusion by creating multiple monitoring agencies
(secret services) to spy on each other. By making these security services compete, a dictator re-
duces the danger of collusion between them and bureaucrats, but also incurs a risk of information
leakage to the public, not to mention substantial technical costs and delays. This has been espe-
cially visible in “sultanistic regimes” (Chehabi and Linz, 1998; Egorov and Sonin, 2004)–examples
include Idi Amin in Uganda, Francisco Machas Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, Claude Duvalier in
Haiti, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Reza Shah Pahlavi
in Iran, Mobutu in Zaire, and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, who combined dictatorial op-
pression with dismal economic performance. Introducing a collection of case studies, Chehabi and
Linz (1998) speciﬁcally point out that such regimes were especially likely to occur in resource-rich
countries; under these regimes, the media were tightly controlled and quality of government was
very low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature, and Sec-
tion 3 introduces the theoretical model and derives empirical predictions. In Section 4, we present
empirical support for our theory and describe robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Both political scientists and economists have been long aware that countries that have abundant
natural resources and are not mature democracies perform, on average, less successfully than
resource-poor countries (see, e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1996, 1997a,b; Auty, 2001; Gylfason, Her-
bertsson, and Zoega, 1999; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006). The early economics literature on
the “resource curse” attributed the failure of growth-oriented strategies in resource-rich countries to
the “Dutch disease”: the inﬂow of oil revenues leads to appreciation of the domestic currency, which
makes domestic tradable sectors less competitive (see Sachs and Warner, 1996 and Krugman, 1987).
Yet in the recent “resource curse” literature, there is an emerging consensus that the major source
of slow growth in resource-rich countries is the deterioration of institutions rather than currency
appreciation. (There is also a large recent empirical literature linking resource wealth to violent
9conﬂicts, see Ross, 2003.) The general mechanism of such deterioration was described by North
(1981, 1991) and, most recently, by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); the crucial role of institutions
in generating the “resource curse” is analyzed in Lane and Tornell (1996), Robinson, Torvik, and
Verdier (2004), Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006), Caselli (2006), Hodler (2006), and Boschini et
al. (2006). We attempt to go beyond these general insights to explain the microeconomicss of the
decision-making process in non-democracies that leads to ineﬃcient economic policy choices.
In political science, there is an emerging literature that relates economic performance and
regime stability to the presence of natural resources. In a now-classic early study, Karl (1997)
explained the failure of oil-producers to fully employ the development potential of natural resources
by adding political considerations to the standard “Dutch disease” explanation (see also Gelb,
1988, Shafer, 1994, and Chaudhry, 1997.). Oil windfalls allow the state to develop a rent-oriented
bureaucracy that does not need to encourage taxable domestic production and thus escapes political
accountability. Ross (2001) notes that critical empirical contributions to the modernization debate
by Przeworski and Limongi (1993) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) did not
consider oil-rich Middle East states; in his own regressions, the Middle East dummy is signiﬁcant
and has a negative impact on democracy. On the other hand, Herb (2005) argues that rentierism,
i.e. the government’s reliance on oil taxes to provide public goods, has no signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on democracy. Morrison (2009) ﬁnds that the particular source of non-tax revenue has no
speciﬁc impact on regime stability; an increase in any of them (e.g., foreign aid or windfall oil
proﬁts) leads to more social spending in dictatorships and more stability for both democratic and
dictatorial regimes. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) model and then test empirically whether or not
governments in resource-rich countries use their resource rents in order to “thwart threats emanating
from the opposition”. The authors assume that the presence of mineral resources decreases the
need for the dictator to engage opposition in cooperation; empirically, such a presence indeed leads
to a smaller number of legislative parties (the authors’ proxy for actual cooperation).
Wantchekon (2002) argues that resource wealth helps dictators stay in power by sharing rents
with the would-be opposition. Dunning (2005) considers a model where the elites weigh the costs
and beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation: both the structure of the resource sector in and outside of the
country and the extent of potential political opposition aﬀect the trade-oﬀ. Snyder (2006) proposes
an alternative model in which the stability of the political regime rests on its ability to build
institutions of extraction of lootable resources. Benjamin Smith (2004) uses panel data on 107
10developing states covering the period of 1960-1999 to argue that the presence of oil is associated
with increased regime durability (see also Ulfelder, 2007); in individual countries, there is no
robust impact of changes in oil prices on regime stability. Alastair Smith (2008) tests empirical
implications from the selectorate model of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), which relate the survival
of dictatorial regimes to the presence of natural resources. The existing evidence does suggest that
the trade-oﬀ between incentives for bureaucracy and the need to “divide-and-rule” (see Debs, 2007)
by suppressing information ﬂows is especially visible in developing countries abundant with natural
resources.
For our formal model, we use recent advances in political economics, with its emphasis on
dynamic models of strategic interaction between politicians and their citizenry (e.g., Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu, 2003, 2006; Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier, 2004, Lagunoﬀ, 2006;
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The literature on optimal sequencing between economic and
political liberalization is discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2006), who were also among the ﬁrst
to consider revolution as a global game (our model might be considered an alternative approach to
modeling a solution to the coordination problem in revolutions). Edmond (2005) models a global
game between citizens, who need to coordinate to overthrow a regime, and studies the regime’s
incentives to use propaganda to exploit heterogeneity in individual beliefs. Bueno de Mesquita
and Downs (2005) introduce the concept of a coordination good and argue that media freedom is
actually such a good as it helps citizens to overcome the free-rider problem.
Finally, there is the fast-growing literature on the political economy of the media (see Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2008). Sen (1999) and Besley and Prat (2006) emphasize the role of independent me-
dia in enhancing citizens’ ability to choose the right politicians and policies: our model emphasis
the role media might play in providing incentives to bureaucrats. Reinikka and Svensson (2005)
and Kaufman (2006) show empirically that media freedom helps to reduce corruption. Dyck and
Zingales (2002) consider a situation where business reporting is endogenously biased; free compet-
itive media is the only way to commit not to collude with the sources of exclusive information.
Svaleryd and Vlachos (2006) demonstrate that increased political competition and extensive media
coverage in a mature democracy reduce political rents. Our work contributes to this literature by
analyzing the determinants of the media freedom outside of the democratic world.
113T h e o r y
Political decisions that citizens and politicians make are inherently dynamic: citizens decide whether
to reelect the incumbent or revolt against him by comparing the expected performance of the
incumbent and of the contender; similarly, the politician’s desire to stay in oﬃce depends on the
rents of being in power in the future. However, the important trade-oﬀst h a tw ee m p h a s i z ei nt h i s
paper are easier to demonstrate in a reduced-form one-period model, where we take the citizens’
decisions to overthrow the ruler as ﬁxed. We thus start with the simple model, and then provide a
sketch of a fully dynamic model, where citizens’ decisions are endogenized.
3.1 Setup
There is a dictator, a bureaucrat, and a continuum of ex-ante identical citizens. Following a
standard theoretical framework (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), the economy includes two
sectors: the resource sector and the modern sector. The resource sector produces a globally traded
good, which yields YR = R; the cost of production is normalized to zero. The total output in
the modern sector depends on the provision of a public good such as property rights and contract
enforcement, infrastructure, education, etc. The amount of public good provided, A ∈
©
AH,A Lª
,
depends both on the policy chosen by a dictator, and the eﬀorts exerted by the bureaucrat.
The dictator’s ability to chose a right policy from the policy space is imperfect: the probability
of picking a right policy is v ∈ (0,1). The bureaucrat does not observe whether the policy picked
by the dictator is right or wrong, but may either high or low eﬀort e ∈
©
eH,e Lª
.T h e c o s t o f
high eﬀort is c>0, while low eﬀort is costless. We assume a perfect complementarity between the
dictator’s policy choice and the bureaucrat’s eﬀort. If bureaucrat exerts high eﬀort eH,a n dt h e
policy choice is right, then A = AH.I f e i t h e r e ﬀort is low (e = eL) or the policy is wrong, then
A = AL <A H.
The output of the modern sector is normalized to YM = A; thus, the total output in the economy
equals
Y ≡ YR + YM = R + A.
The dictator, if he stays in power, gets all the proceeds from the resource sector, and taxes the
modern sector at an exogenous rate τ. However, if the dictator is replaced, he gets nothing (and
the resources and taxes are consumed by the new dictator, who is not a player in the one-period
12model). The incumbent’s utility is therefore
UD =( τA+ R)I{stays in power} − [payments to bureaucrat],( 1 )
where I{X} is the indicator function, which takes the value of 1 if event X happens, and 0 otherwise.
We assume that
τ
¡
AH − AL¢
>c ,( 2 )
i.e., the cost of high eﬀort is suﬃciently low, so that the dictator, if he were certain to stay in
power, would choose high eﬀort.
Citizen i gets pre-tax income yi ∈
©
yL,yHª
, which is a noisy signal about the output of the
modern sector. Thus, the probability of getting high income, yH is γ ∈
¡1
2,1
¢
when YM = AH and
1 − γ if YM = AL:
yH =
γAH − (1 − γ)AL
2γ − 1
,y L =
γAL − (1 − γ)AH
2γ − 1
(both yL and yH are positive if γ is not too close to 1
2). The after-tax income of citizen i is thus
(1 − τ)yi.
Apart from the income yi, the citizens get a public signal spub about the policy outcome A,
which is generated by mass media. This signal may take one of two values, AH and AL.W ea s s u m e
that without censorship, free media are able to generate truthful signal (or, equivalently, are unable
to conceal the true evidence), so then spub = A. However, if the media are censored, they always
generate a high signal spub = AH. The dictator chooses an incentive scheme to the bureaucrat in
order to maximize his utility UD, but he can only condition his payments to bureaucrat on the
media report st ∈
©
AL,A Hª
that he gets about this bureaucrat’s performance.10 Consequently,
censorship prevents the dictator from providing proper incentives to bureaucrats.
The incumbent dictator may be ousted in two ways. First, there are elections, where citizens
can replace the dictator by the challenger. We assume (and show that this will happen in an
equilibrium of the dynamic game, see below) that citizen i votes for the incumbent if and only
if yi = yH and spub = AH; otherwise she votes for the challenger. If the incumbent obtains the
10Technically, the dictator may infer information on bureaucratic eﬀorts from the tax revenues he recieves. In
the working paper version of the model, we considered a more realistic setup with multiple bureaucrauts, and an
opportunity to use a centralized source of information such as a secret service. We also considered setups with
competing secret services and competitive media market, which produce expected results at the cost of additional
notation and length.
13majority of votes, he retains power. However, he may stay in power even if he loses: to capture the
nature of non-democratic politics, we assume that if the majority votes in favor of the challenger, the
incumbent is ousted with probability α ∈ (0,1). Parameter α captures the democratic constraints
on the dictator: in a perfect democracy (α =1 ) , the majority vote decides who is in power, while in
a perfect dictatorship α =0 , elections do not matter at all. If the incumbent wins the elections, the
citizens decide whether to revolt or not. Again, we assume that citizen i participates in the revolt
if spub = AL only (in the dynamic game, this happens endogenously), and the revolt succeeds if a
majority of citizens participate in it. Taking part in an unsuccessful revolt costs each participant
r>0; this assumption will be important in the dynamic game.11
The timing of the one-period game is as follows.
1. The incumbent dictator picks a policy (which turns out to be correct with probability ν),
chooses the degree of media freedom, and makes contracts with the bureaucracy (payments
wL and wH, depending on spub ∈
©
AL,A Hª
)
2. The bureaucrat chooses the eﬀort level et ∈
©
eL,e Hª
.
3. The policy outcome A is realized; each citizen i learns his/her individual payoﬀ yi.
4. The dictator pays the bureaucrat according to the contract.
5. Media report the true outcome, spub = A if they are free, and spub = AH, otherwise.
6. Elections take place.
7. If the incumbent wins the elections, each citizen decides whether or not to revolt. If the revolt
is successful, a dictator is replaced, otherwise he stays in power.
3.2 Analysis
We start the analysis by ﬁnding the optimal contract for the bureaucrat for the cases of free
and censored media. Let wH denote the payment that the dictator makes to the bureaucrat if
11While we do not develop a full-scale theory of collective action in revolution (see a recent discussion in Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006; Persson and Tabellini, 2006; and Edmond, 2006), these assumptions allow us to illuminate the
diﬀerence in the trade-oﬀs each citizen faces with or without free media. Essentially, when media are non-free, the
free-rider problem makes revolution much less likely, while with free media, each citizen better assesses information
available to his fellow citizens.
14spub = AH, and let wL be the payment if spub = AL. When media are free, the bureaucrat
compares the expected payoﬀ of low eﬀorts, wL, and that of high eﬀorts, νwH +( 1− ν)wL − c.
Thus, the bureaucrat exerts high eﬀorts if and only if
v
¡
wH − wL¢
≥ c. (3)
If the dictator chooses to induce a low eﬀort level, then wL = wH =0 . To induce the high eﬀort
level, the dictator chooses free media and sets
¡
wL,wH¢
=( 0 ,c/ν). A more competent dictator
(one with higher ν) is more interested in providing good incentives to the bureaucrat. Indeed, the
expected cost of paying for high eﬀorts does not vary with ν, but the beneﬁts of high-powered
incentives are greater for a more competent dictator. If an absolutely competent dictator (ν =1 )
chooses high-powered incentive schemes for the bureaucrats with the help of free media, then his
policy results in the optimal level of public good, AH. As good incentives are more important for
a more competent dictator, he is more interested in free media.
Essentially, the dictator has three regimes to choose from: censored media and low bureaucratic
eﬀort, free media and low eﬀort, and free media and high eﬀort. The dictator never chooses the
combination of free press and low eﬀort, as this option is dominated by censored press and low eﬀort.
Given our assumptions about the citizens’ preferences (they replace the incumbent if spub = AL),
the probabilities of staying in power in the case of free and censored media are ν and αν +(1− α),
respectively. Thus, free media and high incentives give the dictator utility UM = ν
¡
R + τAH¢
−c,
while censored media give him UL =( αν +( 1− α))
¡
R + τAL¢
. Now let us introduce
R(α)=
c + τ
¡
(αν +( 1− α))AL − vAH¢
1+ν − α + αν
The following Proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 1 Under assumption (2), the following statements hold:
(i) In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the dictator chooses free media if the amount of resource
rent does not exceed the threshold R = R(α); the dictator chooses censorship otherwise.
(ii) In a more democratic country, the media freedom threshold is higher: R(α) is increasing
in α. In a perfect democracy (α =1 ), the dictator always prefers media freedom.
Thus, the model generates a number of testable predictions about the determinants of media
freedom. The foremost prediction is that in a non-democratic country, resource abundance (a high
R) results in a lower media freedom. In a democracy, the dictator and his bureaucracy are bound
15to cope with free media. As shown above, if α =1 , media freedom prevails in equilibrium under
any level of resource richness R.I fα is slightly below 1 (and α>1 − ν), then media freedom is
suppressed only if resource abundance is very high. Thus, we do not expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects
of natural resources on media freedom in democratic countries, where monitoring of bureaucracy
is carried out via the division of powers, opposition parties, etc.
3.3 Dynamic Extension
In the dynamic model, the incumbent dictator and citizens are long-lived; if citizens opt to replace
the incumbent, there is a new player. Each period, the stage game is as in the one-period game
above: the dictator picks a policy, chooses the degree of media freedom, and provides a contract to
the short-lived bureaucrat. Then, the bureaucrat chooses the eﬀort level, and each citizen receives
two signals: one about her individual payoﬀ and a media report. .At the end of each period, each
citizen decides whether or not to participate in a revolt against the dictator. In the dynamic game,
citizen i maximizes her expected life-time welfare
∞ X
t0=t
β(t0−t)Et
¡
(1 − τ)yi
t0 − rI
©
i participates in unsuccessful revolt in period t0ª¢
,
while the incumbent dictator maximizes
∞ X
t0=t
β(t0−t)Et
¡
(τAt + R)I
©
stays in power in period t0ª
−
£
payments to B in period t0¤¢
.
Since payoﬀ-relevant variables may include all private signals that individuals got during the rule
of the incumbent dictator, the widely-used concept of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (Maskin and
Tirole, 2001) is not directly applicable. On the other hand, the set of all subgame perfect equilibria
is too large, thus necessitating a reﬁnement that combines the main features of the two concepts.
We impose the following intuitive assumptions.
In the dynamic setting, we modify the citizens preferences so that they rationally update their
estimate of the dictator’s competence; now, the dictator and any of his potential replacements might
be of one of two types, either competent, or incompetent. First, we assume that citizen i revolts if
and only if (i) she knows that the probability of the incumbent dictator being competent is below
µ, the probability that a random draw from the pool of challengers is competent, and (ii) she is
certain that the share of those who want to replace the incumbent exceeds the revolution threshold
γ. Second, we assume that the distribution of idiosyncratic noise F (·), the revolution threshold
16γ, and parameters that reﬂect dictator’s abilities are such that under a high-powered system for
bureaucracts. a competent dictator can keep, if chooses to, the share of potential revolutionaries
below γ. Finally, we focus on stationary equilibria, in which dictator’s strategy may depend only
on the dictator’s type, but not on time.
If the dictator is incompetent, there is a non-trivial probability that the policy chosen in period
t, is a wrong one. In this case, the probability that media report the truth (st = AL)i se q u a l
to 1 if media is free and to α>0, if not. Therefore, every rational citizen that receives public
signal st = AL is bound to believe, regardless of her private information, that the incumbent is
incompetent; the information that the dictator is incompetent becomes common knowledge. As a
result, all citizens revolt and the incumbent is replaced.
Now consider a dictator who has had only positive media reports s
pub
1 ,...,s
pub
n for n periods
since coming to power. By the Bayes’ formula, citizen i attributes a non-trivial probability to
the event that the incumbent dictator is competent even if i’s personal income is consistently low.
The problem is that a citizen who has received a stream of positive public signals cannot be sure
that the number of citizens who think that the probability of the dictator being inept is above
1 − µ is suﬃcient for a revolt to succeed. Indeed, when a citizen becomes just ready to revolt,
she believes that most other citizens lag behind her in their conﬁdence that the dictator is inept,
because otherwise the revolt would have already occurred before. If media report failure, it becomes
common knowledge that the dictator is inept, allowing the citizens to coordinate. Summing up, a
dictator stays in power as long as the citizens get a positive public report spub = AH. If citizens
get a negative public report spub = AL, they revolt, and the dictator is replaced by a new one.
Similarly to the one-period model, we can now check that if a competent dictator chooses a
high-powered incentive scheme, there is no revolt. By providing no incentives, the dictator saves c
on the bureaucrat’s wage, but loses τ
¡
AH − AL¢
as there is a chance of policy failure. Assumption
(2) implies that this outcome is strictly dominated by that of the high-powered incentives. The
Bellman equation allows to calculate the competent dictator’s expected life-time utility:
U =
1
1 − β
¡
v
¡
R + τAH¢
− c
¢
.
An inept dictator faces a similar choice: between high incentives and free media (we denote this
choice M) and low incentives (L).
Then the dictator’s expected utility at the beginning of a period when he is in power, U,i s
17found as a solution to
U =m a x{UM,U L};w h e r e ( 4 )
UM = R + τ
¡
vAH +( 1− v)AL¢
− c + βvU;
UL = R + τAL + β (1 − α)U.
In an equilibrium, the dictator prefers free media to censorship as long as
U∗
M =
R + τ
¡
vAH +( 1− v)AL¢
− c
1 − βν
>U ∗
L =
R + τAL
1 − β (1 − α)
.( 5 )
Denote
R =
τA(1 − βν) −
¡
τ
¡
vAH +( 1− v)AL¢
− c
¢
(1 − β (1 − α))
β (ν − (1 − α))
,
the threshold level of resource abundance. When 0 <α<1 − ν, (5) is equivalent to R ≤ R.I f
1 − ν ≤ α ≤ 1, (5) is equivalent to R ≥ R, but R<0 in this case, so (5) holds for any R>0.T h e
following Proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2 At any period of his tenure, a competent dictator is strictly better oﬀ allowing free
media and choosing a high-powered incentive scheme. The incompetent dictator’s equilibrium choice
of the regime depends on the level of democracy α and the resource abundance R as follows:
(i) If the democratic institutions are weak, 0 <α<1 − ν, media freedom is chosen if and only
if the resource abundance is low, R ≤ R. If the resource abundance is high R>R, the dictator
chooses low incentives and no media freedom.
(ii) If the democratic institutions are suﬃciently strong, 1 − ν ≤ α ≤ 1, the dictator always
prefers to provide high incentives and allow for free media.
4 Evidence
In this section, we use panel data to explore empirical evidence about the relationship between
oil and media freedom. To check the main testable prediction that oil abundance has an adverse
eﬀect on media freedom in non-democracies, we use data on natural resources, levels of democracy,
media freedom, and economic performance.
4.1 Data
We employ several sources of data. We use the Press Freedom index available from Freedom House
as a proxy for media freedom. Although certain information on media freedom is available for years
18as early as 1979, the detailed data started only in 1993, so we use the data for years 1993—2006.
Press Freedom is constructed by Freedom House as an integer between 0 (perfectly free media) and
100 (no media freedom). In order to facilitate interpretation we use (100 — Freedom House Index)
as a measure of media freedom, so in this section, a greater media freedom index corresponds to
freer media. Note that the Freedom House data cover both printed and broadcast media.
We use the Polity2 variable from Polity IV dataset as a proxy for the degree of democracy. This
variable is essentially computed by subtracting Polity IV’s institutionalized autocracy score (AU-
TOC) from the institutionalized democracy score (DEMOC); the resulting Polity2 score ranges
from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). This score measures the competi-
tiveness and openness of executive recruitment, the competitiveness of political participation, and
constraints on the executive as well as other features of the political regime. The variable does
not measure directly media freedom or freedom of speech. Therefore it is the best available (albeit
imperfect) proxy for α,a si tc a p t u r e st h ee ﬀectiveness of removing an inept dictator from oﬃce
through the political process rather than through revolt. We also try other variables from Polity
IV and other sources as a proxy for democracy, and the results are similar.
We proxy resource endowment by proven oil reserves, which are presumably exogenous. While
investment in geological exploration aﬀects this variable, these investments need not depend on the
level of economic development. Even if investment in exploration depends on a country’s level of
development, it is more plausible that well-developed countries have had more time and resources to
invest. Thus, ceteris paribus, proven reserves should be higher in well-developed countries; hence,
this eﬀect would only bias our estimates towards zero.
We focus on oil as (i) it is by far the most important natural resource (see Tsui, 2005 who
argues that the global market for oil is larger than market for all other natural resources combined),
(ii) reliable data on oil reserves and production are easily available, and (iii) oil is globally traded
(unlike, e.g., natural gas).12 The existence of the world market price allows us to explore diﬀerential
reactions to worldwide shocks. Certainly, countries diﬀer in terms of oil quality and extraction costs,
but the data on the latter are less reliable. Also, these diﬀerences are much less important once we
control country ﬁxed eﬀects. We use data from the Statistical Review of World Energy, available
12We have also used the mineral resources depletion variable from the World Development Indicators (see the
discussion of the variable in Hamilton and Clemens, 1999, and Ross, 2006). This variable includes all the mineral
resources. While variable is available for a signiﬁcantly smaller sample, the results (available upon request) with this
variable instead of oil reserves or oil production are similar.
19on BP’s web-site (http://www.bp.com). This Statistical Review contains only data for countries
that have positive oil reserves or produce a positive amount of oil; therefore, we assume trivial oil
reserves and production for other countries, unless clearly stated that the data are not available.
We use reserves in billion barrels rather than in dollar terms; our results are robust to this choice.
Also, we control for oil price changes by including time dummies in our panel regressions. Note
that proven reserves include reserves that are economically relevant given the prevailing oil price;
this also makes this variable a proxy for the expected value of future resource rents.
A number of important contributions to the study of the resource curse (e.g., Mehlum, Moene,
and Torvik, 2006; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Ross, 2001) proxy resource endowments by using
the share of natural resources in GDP or exports. Unfortunately (as discussed in e.g. Ross, 2006),
these variables may be highly endogenous with respect to both growth (or growth opportunities)
and institutions. In fact, since the mining industry does not usually require much human capital—
a n di fi td o e s ,i tm a yb ev e r yw e l lp r o v i d e db yf o r e i g nﬁrms—the share of mining industry in
GDP is actually a proxy for underdevelopment. For instance, the U.S. is well endowed with natural
resources, including oil; yet, extraction and drilling comprise a small part of GDP, as other industries
are highly developed as well. Moreover, high resource exports may also be, for any given resource
endowment, a proxy for the lack of growth opportunities: the lack of internal demand for fuels
m a k e sp r o d u c e r se x p o r tt h e m .
Using reserves rather than other measures of resource-richness is consistent with our model’s
logic. Indeed, the dictator’s incentives to censor the media are driven by the future resource rents
he expects to get while in oﬃce. It is therefore more important which oil rents will be appropriated
in the future. Though using oil reserves facilitates interpretation of our ﬁndings, we also employed
oil production and share of oil production or exports in GDP as alternative measures of resource-
richness and obtain the same results. Our results are also robust to using the dollar value of either
reserves or production at current prices.
In order to measure the eﬀect of media freedom on the quality of bureaucracy, we use the
World Bank’s data on government eﬀectiveness and regulatory quality (from the Governance and
Anti-Corruption project of the World Bank Institute, http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance,
or Kaufman et al., 2006). Finally, we use data on GDP per capita (purchasing power parity),
population, government expenditure, and other relevant controls from the World Development
Indicators.
204.2 Empirical Methodology and Alternative Explanations
In order to test whether oil endowment aﬀects media freedom in non-democratic countries, we
estimate the following speciﬁcation:
MFi,t+1 = a0 + a1Oili,t + a2Democracyi,t + a3Xi,t + δi + λt + εit (6)
Here i indexes countries, t indexes years, Oil is the proxy for oil abundance (log oil reserves or log oil
production), MF is media freedom, Democracy is the proxy for democracy (Polity2 or alternative
measures), X is a vector of controls (including log GDP per capita, log population, log share of
government expenditures in GDP etc.), δi are country ﬁxed eﬀects, and λt are year dummies.
Our theory predicts that a1 < 0, especially if the regression is run on a subsample of non-
democratic countries, and a1 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for democratic countries. The
other way to show that the relationship between resources and media freedom is stronger for
non-democratic countries is to add an interaction term a4Oili,tDemocracyi,t. Our theory implies
a4 > 0.
Notice that as our vector of controls X includes log GDP per capita, log population, and log
share of government expenditure in GDP, our speciﬁcation (6) automatically controls for oil reserves
per capita, oil production per capita, or ratio of oil reserves or oil production to GDP, as well as
total GDP, or government expenditures per capita etc. All these variables are linear combinations
of the variables that are already included in (6). Similarly, time dummies automatically account
for the world oil prices, and country dummies include all time-invariant country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
such as legal origin, culture, religion, ethnic and linguistic characteristics.
Our theory is not the only explanation of the relationship between the natural resource endow-
ment and media freedom in non-democratic societies. For example, a benevolent dictator might
want to reform his bureaucracy and be willing to do so via paying high eﬃciency wages to the
bureaucrats. Resource rents allow him to ﬁnance strong incentives without distortionary taxation;
the greater the rents and the higher the eﬃciency wages, the fewer independent journalists the
dictator needs. The bureaucrats are punished very rarely but the punishment is large: the dicta-
tor takes away the high eﬃciency wage. This explanation is not very likely. It would imply that
resource endowments would be correlated with lower corruption and better governance. We test
this prediction directly and ﬁnd that it is not consistent with the evidence: resource-rich countries
are less well governed and more corrupt.
21A more realistic alternative explanation is a very simple one: non-democratic regimes do not
like free media. However, citizens value media freedom per se; hence, a dictator has to compensate
them for censorship. Similarly, if foreign partners or international organizations exert pressure in
favor of media freedom, a dictator has to be economically strong either to withstand this pressure
or to buy oﬀ the citizens’ or foreign partners’ tacit acceptance of censorship. In both cases, resource
rents provide a source of revenue that helps to silence the media. However, this argument assumes
that resource rents come as an additional revenue source. In order to control for this alternative
explanation, we include aggregate income (GDP) and total government spending, the dictator with
a greater share of oil in GDP and in the government budget has an easier time buying oﬀ citizens
or foreigners. Why are citizens happier to exchange media freedom for a dollar just because it is a
petrodollar? The argument that oil rents are less distortionary than taxes and therefore easier to
use for comforting the citizens is not consistent. If taxes are distortionary, the dictator should pay
oﬀ the voters by lowering taxes rather than by giving out petrodollars (actually, many dictators do
exactly this, granting voters “no taxation” in exchange for “no representation”).
The other distinction between our theory and this alternative explanation is whether media
freedom depends on the value of the future revenues (i.e. the value of oil reserves) or the present
resource rents (i.e. this year’s oil production). These two variables are certainly highly correlated;
hence, in order to see which explanation is supported by the data, one needs to run a ‘horse race’
via adding both oil reserves and oil production in one regression.
The second major alternative explanation suggests that the relationship between oil and media
freedom is driven by a third variable, regime type. Oil-rich countries tend to be less democratic,
and less democratic countries also tend to have lower media freedom. In order to control for this
explanation, we always include democracy scores into regressions for media freedom. We also
run regressions for subsamples of democracies and non-democracies (using diﬀerent thresholds for
democracy scores). We also use a two stage procedure, running media freedom on democracy ﬁrst,
and then estimating the relationship between oil and media freedom residuals. As the latter are
not correlated with democracy scores, we obtain the eﬀect of oil on media freedom.
Yet another argument is that media freedom is a normal good, so it is more likely to occur in
more aﬄuent societies. Coincidentally, rich countries are also the ones that are oil-poor. However,
as we control for GDP per capita, this argument does not invalidate our results.
Finally, media freedom as well as democracy can be driven by a long history of development
22of political and economic institutions, due to colonial history, legal origin, religion, culture, etc.
We show that our results hold even when we control for country ﬁxed eﬀects; therefore, all long-
term and slowly changing factors are accounted for. As an additional check, we also estimate
cross-sectional speciﬁcations and ﬁnd that the cross-sectional and panel estimation produce similar
magnitudes of the eﬀect.
4.3 Results
The results are presented in the Tables 1-5 in the Appendix. Tables 1 and 2 report the main
results from the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions, Table 3 presents the tests of the relationship between oil,
democracy, and media freedom. Table 4 reports the eﬀect of media freedom and oil on the quality
of governance. The cross-country OLS regressions are presented in the Table 5.
The results are consistent with the model’s predictions, and are robust to the choice of spec-
iﬁcation, econometric methodology, and sample selection. In particular, the results hold both in
panel regressions with country ﬁxed eﬀects, and in cross-country OLS regressions, in regressions
with oil reserves and oil production, etc.
Main Results
In Table 1, we report the results from the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions. Controlling for the level of
development (proxied by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity) and democracy level, media
freedom is negatively correlated with oil reserves. This correlation is stronger in the less democratic
countries. In the regressions in Column (1), we control for the interaction term between democracy
and oil abundance. The coeﬃcient on oil reserves is negative and signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient
on the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant. The less developed the democracy, the stronger
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of oil reserves on media freedom.
In Table 1, we also report the results with alternative measures of oil abundance. In regres-
sion (2) we use oil reserves valued at the current global oil price. The results provide strong evidence
that oil prices negatively aﬀect media freedom in oil-rich countries. In regression (3) we replace
oil reserves with current oil production in barrels, in regression (4) — with oil production in dollar
terms. We control for country size in terms of population (land area is captured by the ﬁxed ef-
fects). The eﬀect of population may reﬂect the importance of media as a coordination device. The
sign of the coeﬃcient is consistent with our model. The more populous the country, the harder
23it is for people to coordinate without media; thus the media is vital for overthrowing the dictator
so the dictator prefers censorship. Including the country’s population in the regression also helps
assure that we control for oil reserves per capita as well as total oil reserves. We also control for
GDP per capita and for the size of the government (log share of government expenditures in GDP).
Controlling for the size of the government allows to take into account the amount of resources under
direct government’s control.
In order to provide a direct test for the prediction that resource abundance aﬀect media freedom
in non-democratic countries, we estimate the speciﬁcation (6) for a subsample of non-democratic
countries. In Columns (5) and (6) we present the results for the subsample of countries where the
Polity2 score of democracy in 1992 was below or equal to 5 (the median democracy score in our
sample is between 5 and 6). The results are consistent with our theory: oil aﬀects media freedom
negatively and signiﬁcantly. In Column (5), the oil abundance is proxied by oil reserves and in
Column (6) we use oil production. Notice that as long as we estimate the original speciﬁcation (6)
without the interaction term, there is no diﬀerence between using barrels or dollar values of oil:
current oil price is captured by time dummies.
In Column (7), we include both oil reserves and oil production in the regression. Such a ‘horse
race’ allows us to distinguish between our theory and the alternative explanations described above.
Our theory implies that dictators take into account oil reserves when making a decision on cen-
sorship. The alternative explanations predict relationship between media freedom and current
resource rents (that allow to silence the opposition/citizens or to share with bureaucrats). Current
oil production is the best proxy for current oil rents available (as we assume that country ﬁxed
eﬀects control for cost diﬀerentials between countries). As oil output and oil resources are highly
correlated, one can only compare their eﬀects including them into regression simultaneously. Col-
umn (7) shows that the eﬀect of oil reserves is—as predicted by our theory—negative and signiﬁcant.
Once we control for the oil reserves, the oil production is not signiﬁcant; in a sense, our theory
‘wins the horse race’.
In Table 2, we provide further evidence. First, we split the sample into smaller subsamples.
In Columns (1)-(3) we present the evidence for three roughly equal subsamples of autocracies
(Polity2≤ 0 in 1992, 58 countries), imperfect democracies (Polity2 ∈ (0,8], 46 countries), and
democracies (Polity2 > 8, 46 countries). We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of oil abundance on media freedom is
negative and signiﬁcant in autocracies and imperfect democracies, and that there is no relationship
24for democracies.
In order to check whether our results are driven by outliers, we have run a jackknife test leaving
out one country at a time. The results (not reported in the tables; available upon request) are
t h es a m ea sw i t ht h ef u l ls a m p l e . W eh a v ea l s oe s t i m a t e dam e d i a nr e g r e s s i o nf o rt h es a m p l eo f
non-democracies (Polity2≤ 8) and found that the results do not change (Column (4) in Table 2).
These estimates suggest that our results are not determined by outliers.
In Columns (5)-(8), we replace the Polity2 score with the other proxies of democracies. First, we
use DEMOC variable from the Polity IV dataset and ﬁnd similar results: for the speciﬁcations with
interaction term (Column (5)) and without interaction term for the subsample of non-democracies
(Column (6)). Then, columns (7) and (8) report the evidence with the Political Rights variable
from the Freedom House. The results are again consistent with our model’s predictions.
Natural Resources, Democracy and Media Freedom
One of the main alternative explanations of the relationship between the natural resource endow-
ment and media freedom is the fact that both variables are correlated with the level of democracy.
Indeed, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, democracy (proxied by Polity2 score) always has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on media freedom even controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects, time dummies,
level of development, oil etc. Table 3 shows that democracy is also correlated with oil abundance.
Whether we use oil reserves (regressions (1)-(4)) or oil production (regression (5)), whether we
use the full sample (regressions (1), (5)) or split it into autocracies (regression (2), Polity2 is not
positive in 1992), imperfect democracies (regression (3), Polity 2 positive but not higher than 8), or
democracies (regression (4), Polity2 above 8 in 1992), oil abundance has a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on democracy. Table 3 therefore reproduces the results from Ross (2001) — using the panel
data and diﬀerent proxies for oil abundance.
On the other hand, these results do not reject our theory. First, in Tables 1 and 2, the eﬀect of
oil on media freedom is negative and signiﬁcant controlling for democracy. Second, the eﬀect of oil
on democracy is negative and signiﬁcant at all levels of democracy while the eﬀect of oil on media
freedom is signiﬁcant only for autocracies and imperfect democracies — as predicted by our theory.
Finally, in Columns (6) and (7) of Table 3, we disentangle the eﬀect of oil on democracy from the
eﬀect of oil on media freedom through the following two stage procedure. In the ﬁrst stage, we
run media freedom on democracy, country ﬁxed eﬀects and other control variables except for oil.
25Then we take the residuals, and estimate a regression for the residuals on oil, country ﬁxed eﬀects
and its other determinants and controls except for democracy. These results are diﬀerent from
those in the Tables 1 and 2 precisely because of the correlation between democracy and oil (and
other regressors). As this correlation is controlled for in the ﬁrst stage, the second stage regressions
for the media freedom residuals capture the relationship between oil and media freedom. The
results are also consistent with our theoretical predictions: both oil reserves (regression (6)) and
oil production (regression (7)) aﬀect media freedom residuals negatively and signiﬁcantly.
Media Freedom and the Quality of Government
Table 4 reports the estimates of the eﬀect of media freedom on the quality of bureaucracy. We use
two dependent variables: government eﬀectiveness and regulatory quality (both from the World
Bank Institute’s Governance Project). Columns (1) and (2) report the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions
for these two indices for 1996-2004. These regressions show that media freedom positively and
signiﬁcantly aﬀects the quality of bureaucracy, controlling for country and time ﬁxed eﬀects, levels
of development and democracy and for natural resources. Columns (3) and (4) present similar
results of cross-country OLS regressions; the dependent variables are averages for the period of
1996-04, and the independent variables are taken at 1995. Figure 4 presents the partial residual
plot for media freedom and the government eﬀectiveness as measured by Kaufmann et al (2006),
while Figure 5 presents the partial residual plot for media freedom and control of corruption.
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Figure 4: Media Freedom and Quality of
Government, residuals
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Figure 5: Media Freedom and Control of
Corruption, residuals
26Finally, in regressions (5) and (6) we instrument media freedom by natural resources, democracy,
interaction of oil and democracy, log GDP per capita etc.). Again, the results are consistent with
our theory.
Notice that in all the speciﬁcations, the direct eﬀect of democracy on the quality of the gov-
ernance (controlling for media freedom) is not robust and usually not signiﬁcant. Once again, it
suggests that media freedom and democracy are not the same.
Yet another interesting research question is to study the eﬀect of the interaction between re-
source abundance, media freedom, and bureaucratic incentives on long-run economic growth. A
major obstacle is that there are no systematic media freedom data prior to 1993.
Cross-sectional evidence
In Table 5, we run OLS regressions for the media freedom averaged for 1993-2007 for each country on
country characteristics. In the column (1), we present the results for the whole sample, Column (2)
reports the results for the sample of non-democracies (Polity2≤ 8), Column (3) reports the results
for democracies (Polity2> 8). We ﬁnd that the oil abundance aﬀects media freedom negatively and
signiﬁcantly in the whole sample, but this result is driven by non-democracies; there is no eﬀect in
democracies.
We also estimate a speciﬁcation (4) where we replace contemporaneous measures of democ-
racy with its average level in 1980-1992. In column (5), we instrument democracy with a lagged
democracy score and the results remain the same.
Columns (6) and (7) present the evidence on an alternative measure of media freedom. We use
the media freedom index from Reporters Sans Frontières rather than the more conventional one
from Freedom House (unfortunately, RSF data are only available for a few years and cannot be
used in ﬁxed eﬀects regressions). Again, as we run the estimates for both non-democracies (6) and
democracies (7), we ﬁnd that oil aﬀects media freedom in non-democratic countries.
Alternative explanations and robustness checks
In order to check the robustness of our results we have also run a number of additional tests.
We have estimated all the regressions in Tables 1-5 for the subsamples of countries with large oil
reserves; for all speciﬁcations, we used both oil reserves and oil production; we have controlled for
inequality, internet penetration, adult literacy and other relevant variables; we have tried all splits
27by democracy scores. These tests (available upon request) have shown that our results are robust
and are consistent with our predictions.
Let us now return to the discussion of the alternative explanations we introduced in section
4.2. Our tests above deliver the following implications. First, the evidence is consistent with our
theory even controlling for the alternative explanations. Second, the alternative explanations are
not robust to the choice of speciﬁcation: (i) the coeﬃcients at the GDP per capita and government
spending are often not signiﬁcant, (ii) the coeﬃcient at oil production is not signiﬁcant once we
control for the eﬀect of oil reserves, and (iii) democracy’s eﬀect on the quality of governance is
not signiﬁcant. Finally, we show that, in line with our theory and contrary to the predictions
of the alternative explanations, the relationship between oil and media freedom holds only for
non-democracies.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We study determinants of media freedom in non-democratic countries. In such societies, a dictator
needs an independent source of information on the outcomes of his policies. Otherwise, he can-
not provide incentives for his bureaucracy, which may result in poor economic performance and
eventually cost him his job. The independent and competitive media do provide this information
but cannot commit not to leak it to the citizens. Such leakage undermines the very basis of the
non-democratic regime: the collective action problem in organizing a revolution. If the citizens re-
ceive a public signal about the poor outcomes of the dictator’s policies (e.g., with the help of mass
media) they solve the coordination problem and overthrow the dictator. In order to understand the
dictator’s choice of the extent of media freedom, we use the variation in resource endowments. In
resource-rich countries, the value of remaining in oﬃce is relatively high, and the need to provide
incentives to bureaucracy is less important. Therefore our theory predicts a negative relationship
between resource abundance and media freedom; this relationship should be especially strong in
less democratic countries.
Our analysis of panel data for 1993-2007 is consistent with the model’s predictions. It is
striking that the relationship between oil and media shows up in such a short time period as
14 years. This distinguishes our paper from the other literature on the so called resource curse.
This literature considers the eﬀect of resource abundance on economic and political institutions
(property rights, political competition, party system, constraints on the executive) that change
28very slowly. Therefore, studies of these relationships can only be based on cross-sections. On the
other hand, media freedom is aﬀected almost immediately (see Figure 2), which allows us to run
ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions. We ﬁnd that while the estimates of the magnitude of the eﬀect on media
in panel regressions and in the cross-sectional regressions are similar.
Very recently, two authoritarian regimes have seemingly deﬁed this paper’s logic: Belarus and
China. Both are (relatively) resource-poor and have tightly controlled media, while being appar-
ently successful in terms of economic growth. Our model helps us understand these cases. Belarus
has been receiving substantial support from Russia, mostly in terms of heavily subsidized prices
for oil and natural gas; BRATT (2006) estimates the direct beneﬁts due to these subsidies in
terms of oil and gas prices alone to be around 15% of the Belarussian GDP. Essentially, Alexander
Lukashenko, the Belarussian president, can aﬀord censorship and heavy reliance on secret service;
support from Russia provides suﬃcient rents as if Belarus were a resource-rich country.13
In China, the ruling party is facing exactly the same “Gorbachev’s dilemma” that is the focus
of our paper. On one hand, the tight control over the media stands in the way of attempts to
improve the bureaucratic performance, as the SARS epidemic vividly demonstrated. On the other,
free media would have produced a challenge to the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. One
way to deal with the information problem, which has been adopted by the Chinese leadership,
is to decentralize economic decision-making and even to introduce elections at the municipal and
provincial levels. China has also recently passed a law requiring a major opening up of government
information to the citizens, somewhat along the lines of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act
(“China Sets Out to Cut Secrecy, but Laws Leave Big Loopholes,” New York Times, Apr. 25,
2007). Both government openness and local elections (as well as local riots, see Lorentzen, 2007)14
provide the central government with relatively reliable information on the performance of provincial
bosses. In principle, such mechanisms might prevent nationwide information aggregation, but for
the very same reason they only partially mitigate the incentive costs of censorship.
13We wrote the ﬁrst draft of this paper before the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus. Well in line with our
argument, due to the complete absence of free media, the opposition failed to gather suﬃcient number of protesters to
overthrow the president. Also, the failed attempt demonstrated the tangible risks for revolution participants. Many
protesters, including both opposition presidential candidates, were arrested and/or beaten up.
14See also Lohmann (1994), who studies the informational role of the Leipzig demonstrations in 1989-91. She
argues that the demonstrations provided East German citizens with information on the true extent of dissatisfaction
with the regime. Once this informational task was completed, the demonstrations began to subside.
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35Table 1. Fixed effects regressions for media freedom.  
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
               Non‐democracies  Non‐democracies  Non‐democracies 
      Oil price *    Oil price *  (Polity ≤ 5),  (Polity ≤ 5),  (Polity ≤ 5), 
   Oil reserves  oil reserves  Oil production  Oil production  reserves  production  res. & prod. 
Log oil reserves ‐ 2.14                    
   (1.14)*                    
Log oil reserves    0.16                    
x Polity  (0.07)**                    
Log (oil price * oil reserves)     ‐ 2.3         ‐ 2.87    ‐ 2.46 
      (1.13)**        (1.14)**    (1.19)** 
Log (oil price * oil reserves)      0.07                 
x Polity     (0.04)                 
Log oil production         ‐ 2.13              
         (0.70)***              
Log oil production         0.06              
x Polity         (0.03)**              
Log (oil price * oil production)            ‐ 2.12    ‐ 1.67 ‐ 0.64 
            (0.70)***    (0.61)*** ‐ 0.66 
Log (oil price * oil production)            0.06            
x Polity            (0.03)**            
Polity  0.77  0.57  0.73  0.54            
   (0.10)***  (0.20)***  (0.10)***  (0.17)***            
Log GDP per capita, PPP  1.17  1.26  3.04  3.15 ‐ 3.12 ‐ 1.74 ‐ 2.56 
   ‐1.38 ‐ 1.4  (1.40)**  (1.40)**  (1.43)** ‐ 1.64 ‐ 1.74 
Log Population ‐ 14.15 ‐ 13.41 ‐ 9.62 ‐ 8.87 ‐ 18.34 ‐ 12.06 ‐ 17.92 
   (3.29)***  (3.43)***  (3.31)***  (3.37)***  (5.75)***  (5.45)**  (5.91)*** 
Log (Govt.Exp / GDP) ‐ 1.62 ‐ 1.68 ‐ 1.45 ‐ 1.48  0.17  0.53  0.19 
   (0.88)*  (0.89)*  (0.87)*  (0.87)* ‐ 1.02 ‐ 1.01 ‐ 1.03 
Observations  2057  2056  2077  2076  958  972  954 
Number of countries  147  148  147  148  71  71  71 
R‐squared  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.05  0.04  0.05 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country fixed effects and time dummies are included but not reported. 
Notes: Regressions (1)‐(4) differ in terms of the measure of oil abundance (oil reserves in 1, oil price * oil reserves in 2, oil production in 3, oil price * oil production in 4). These 
regressions are run for the full sample and include an interaction of oil with democracy (proxied by Polity). In regressions (5)‐(7), there is no interaction term, but the sample 
only includes non‐democratic countries (with Polity value in 1992 not exceeding 5). In regression 5, we use oil reserves as proxy for resource abundance, in 6 we use oil 
production, and in 7 we include both. In all regressions, Polity is Polity IV’s POLITY2 variable. All variables are for the current year, media freedom is for the next year. Dependent 
variable is (100 – media freedom, Freedom House).  
Table 2. Additional fixed effects regressions for media freedom. 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
      Imperfect     Non‐democracies  Democ     Polit. rights    
   Autocracies  democracies  Democracies  Polity ≤ 8  instead of  Non‐democracies  instead of  Non‐democracies 
   Polity ≤ 0  0 ≤ Polity ≤ 8  Polity > 8  median reg.  Polity  Democ ≤ 8  Polity  Polit. rights ≤ 5 
Log oil reserves ‐ 4.1 ‐ 5.63 ‐ 3.99 ‐ 3.59 ‐ 2.34 ‐ 4.52 ‐ 2.77 ‐ 3.15 
   (1.32)***  (2.16)***  (2.86)  (0.00)***  (1.16)**  (1.35)***  (1.21)**  (1.34)** 
Log oil reserves                0.4            
x Democracy               (0.15)***            
Democracy                 1.33            
               (0.17)***            
Log oil reserves                      0.6    
x Political Rights                      (0.35)*    
Political Rights                      2.87    
                     (0.29)***    
Log GDP per ‐ 3.06  13.2  11.48 ‐ 4.16  1.91  1.22  0.97 ‐ 0.95 
capita, PPP  (1.37)**  (2.98)***  (2.97)***  (0.00)***  (1.52) ‐ 1.65  (1.4)  (1.53) 
Log Population ‐ 24.77  0.69 ‐ 40.08 ‐ 11.15 ‐ 12.59 ‐ 6.17 ‐ 11.6 ‐ 5.68 
   (6.87)***  (6.43)  (5.77)***  (0.00)***  (3.27)*** ‐ 4.3  (3.23)***  (5.03) 
Log(Govt.Exp / GDP)  1.44 ‐ 4.55 ‐ 5.14 ‐ 0.62 ‐ 1.65 ‐ 0.69 ‐ 1.55 ‐ 2.3 
   (1.11)  (1.46)***  (1.95)***  (0.00)***  (0.94)* ‐ 1.07  (0.87)*  (1.03)** 
Observations  772  669  643  1441  2001  1343  2080  1272 
Number of 
countries  58  46  46   105  147  95  150  93 
R‐squared  0.07  0.12  0.28  0.70   0.14  0.03  0.15  0.02 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country fixed effects and time dummies are included but not reported. 
 
Notes: In regressions (1)‐(4), Polity is POLITY2 variable from Polity IV, in regressions (5)‐(6), Democracy is proxied by DEMOC from POLITY IV, and in regressions (7)‐(8), by 
Political rights from Freedom House. In columns (1)‐(3), three different subsamples of countries are taken. Column 4 is a median regression on the sample of imperfect 
democracies. Columns 5 and 7 replicate regression 1 from Table 1 with a different measure for democracy. Columns 6 and 8 do the same for a subsample of imperfect 
democracies and without the interaction term. All variables are for the current year, media freedom is for the next year. Dependent variable is (100 – media freedom, Freedom 
House).    
Table 3. Relationship between oil, regime type, and media freedom. 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
  Polity  MF residuals 
     Autocracies  Imperfect democracies  Democracies  production        
   Full sample  Polity ≤ 0  0 ≤ Polity ≤ 8  Polity > 8  instead of reserves  reserves  production 
Log oil reserves ‐ 1.43 ‐ 1.83 ‐ 1.52 ‐ 1.02     ‐ 2.75    
   (0.38)***  (0.41)***  (0.60)**  (0.62)*     (1.08)**    
Log oil production                 ‐ 0.71     ‐ 2.51 
               (0.22)***     (0.67)*** 
Log GDP per  0.07 ‐ 0.71  0.97  0.65  0.46  0.56  2.58 
capita, PPP  (0.35)  (0.49)  (0.77)  (0.39)*  (0.43)  (1.38)  (1.40)* 
Log Population  2.8 ‐ 4.95 ‐ 4.3 ‐ 1.7  3.33  0.7  5.13 
   (1.02)***  (2.20)**  (1.92)**  (0.59)***  (1.04)***  (3.24)  (3.25) 
Log (Govt.Exp / GDP)  0.15  0.63  0.83 ‐ 0.84  0.21  0.01  0.25 
   (0.27)  (0.4)  (0.42)**  (0.29)***  (0.27)  (0.88)  (0.87) 
Observations  2152  806  704  642  2172  2057  2077 
Number of countries  148  57  46  45  148  148  148 
R‐squared  0.06  0.3  0.06  0.09  0.06   
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country fixed effects and time dummies are included but not reported. 
 
Notes: In regressions (1)‐(5),dependent variable is POLITY2 from Polity IV, in regressions (6)‐(7), dependent variable is residuals from regression of media freedom (100 – media 
freedom, Freedom House) on POLITY2, country fixed effects and other control variables except for oil. In columns (1)‐(4), we take different samples of countries and oil reserves, 
and in regression 5, production instead of reserves and the full sample. Regressions 6 and 7 have reserves and production as proxies for oil, respectively. All variables are for the 
current year, media freedom is for the next year.   
Table 4. Regressions for quality of governance. 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 
   Fixed Effects   OLS   IV  
   government  regulatory  government  regulatory  government  regulatory 
   effectiveness  quality  effectiveness  quality  effectiveness  quality 
Media Freedom / 100  0.4  0.93  1.53  1.44  6.23  5.47 
   (0.12)***  (0.15)***  (0.31)***  (0.30)***  (2.80)**  (2.51)** 
Log oil reserves ‐ 0.19 ‐ 0.15 ‐ 0.17 ‐ 0.17        
   (0.02)***  (0.03)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***        
Log GDP per  0.6  0.49  0.54  0.48  0.29  0.25 
capita, PPP  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.06)***  (0.05)***  (0.12)**  (0.11)** 
Polity  0  0.01 ‐ 0.02 ‐ 0.01 ‐ 0.12 ‐ 0.1 
  (0)  (0)  (0.01)*  (0.01)  (0.07)*  (0.06) 
Log Population  0.1  0.05  0.11  0.07  0.1  0.05 
   (0.02)***  (0.02)**  (0.03)***  (0.03)**  (0.04)**  (0.04) 
Log (Govt.Exp / GDP)  0.13  0.11  0.14  0.05 ‐ 0.24 ‐ 0.3 
   (0.04)***  (0.05)**  (0.12)  (0.1)  (0.37)  (0.33) 
Observations  1199  1199  135  135  135  135 
Number of countries  146  146  135  135  135  135 
R‐squared  0.09    0.10  0.79  0.8  0.52  0.55 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country fixed effects and time dummies are included (in columns 1 and 2) 
but not reported. 
 
Notes: In regressions 1,3,5 the dependent variable is Government Effectiveness, and in regressions 2,4,6 the dependent variable is Regulatory Quality (both from World Bank 
Institute's Governance Project). Columns 1 and 2 report fixed effects regressions. Columns 3 and 4 are OLS regressions for variables averaged over time. Columns 5 and 6 report 
IV regression, with Media Freedom instrumented by Log oil reserves and other covariates.  In Columns 1  and 2, all variables are for the current year, media freedom is for the 
next year. In all regressions, Media Freedom is divided by 100 to scale the coefficients.  
Table 5. Cross‐sectional regressions. 
 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
               Polity  RSF  RSF 
      Non‐democracies  Democracies  Lagged Polity  instrumented by  Non‐democracies  democracies 
   Full sample  Polity ≤ 8  Polity>8  included  lagged Polity  Polity ≤ 8  Polity > 8 
Log oil reserves ‐ 3.14 ‐ 2.82 ‐ 1.64 ‐ 6.18 ‐ 2.39 ‐ 3.93 ‐ 0.78 
in 1992  (0.89)***  (1.03)***  (1.56)  (1.24)***  (1.08)**  (1.85)**  (0.71) 
Polity, averaged  2.58  2.3  2.5     2.87  2.37 ‐ 0.2 
1993‐2007  (0.17)***  (0.20)***  (0.52)***     (0.25)***  (0.26)***  (1.49) 
Log GDP per  5.69  3.68  6.89  6.53  4.97  2.85  6.25 
capita, PPP, in 1992  (0.90)***  (1.29)***  (1.81)***  (1.40)***  (1.14)***  (1.78)  (0.93)*** 
Log land area  1.55  1.53  1.91  2.65  1.38  2.92 ‐ 0.03 
   (0.61)**  (0.75)**  (1.02)*  (0.92)***  (0.65)**  (0.77)***  (0.47) 
Log population ‐ 1.29 ‐ 1.62 ‐ 2.21 ‐ 1.39 ‐ 1.39 ‐ 5.86 ‐ 1.17 
in 1992  (0.71)*  (0.95)*  (0.99)**  (0.98)  (0.72)*  (1.24)***  (0.64)* 
Log (Govt.Exp / GDP)  2.38 ‐ 0.15  4.69 ‐ 0.94  3.01  2.06 ‐ 0.86 
in 1992  (2.18)  (2.46)  (4.06)  (2.55)  (2.31)  (2.63)  (2.26) 
Polity, averaged            1.46            
1980‐1992             (0.24)***            
Log oil reserves in 1992 x             0.22            
Polity, averaged 1980‐92             (0.12)*            
Observations  134  92  42  130  130  91  41 
R‐squared  0.81  0.66  0.81  0.64  0.8  0.59  0.65 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Notes: All regressions except column 5 are OLS. In regressions (1)‐(5), the dependent variable is Media Freedom, averaged for 1993‐2007. In (6)‐(7), the dependent variable is 
Reporters Sans Frontières, averaged for 2002‐2007. Regressions (1)‐(3) include different sample of countries. In regression (4), lagged Polity (POLITY2 variable averaged for 1980‐
1992) is included. In regression (5), Polity is instrumented by lagged Polity. Regressions 6 and 7 contain the samples of democratic and non‐democratic countries, respectively. 
All variables are averaged 1993‐2007 unless stated otherwise.  
 